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Case No. 20060914-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
distributing or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first 
degree felony (R. 70-71). This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3 (2) (j) (West 2004) . £ee R. 90; Utah R. App. P. 42(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for 
distributing or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, where defendant was contacted 
by telephone to sell cocaine to the target of a controlled buy, 
showed up at the specified location to meet the target, and 
1 
participated in a drugs-for-money exchange with the target, who 
then unwittingly turned the drugs over to the police? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is uso 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v, Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(West 2004), governing 
prohibited controlled substances, provides: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it 
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one enhanced count of unlawfully 
distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii)(West 2004) (R. 1-2). A jury convicted her as charged 
(R. 65-67). The court sentenced her to a term of five years to 
life in the Utah State Prison, imposed a fine of $100, and 
recommended drug treatment while incarcerated (R. 70-71). 
Defendant filed a timely appeal (R. 73) . 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Working with the Weber Morgan Narcotics Task Force, Brian, 
an experienced confidential informant, set up a deal to buy 
cocaine from a woman named Ky (R. 93: 84, 86, 158).l Ky was the 
identified target of the controlled buy (Id. at 158) . Brian 
phoned Ky, who told him to meet her at a Smith's parking lot in 
Ogden (Id. at 86-87, 131, 133). Undercover Officer Grogan drove 
Brian, who had been searched and wired with a monitoring device, 
to the Smith's parking lot, where they met Ky, who arrived in a 
car driven by her brother (Id^ at 86, 88, 113-15, 120). Ky did 
not have drugs with her and so called defendant, arranging to 
meet her at a nearby gas station and mini-mart (Id. at 86, 99-
100, 115-16, 134-35, 159). Ky had no idea that Grogan was a 
police officer or that Brian was a confidential informant (R. 87, 
143-44) . 
Officer Grogan drove Brian and the unwitting Ky to the gas 
station (Id. at 116, 136). Grogan handed Ky a $100 bill, and she 
got out of his car with the bill in her hand and walked over to a 
Pontiac that had just pulled into the parking lot. Defendant was 
the passenger in the Pontiac (Id. at 104, 117, 141, 162). Brian 
testified that the transaction occurred "just really quick. [Ky] 
1
 Brian completed 33 controlled narcotics buys while 
working for the Weber Morgan Narcotics Task Force (R. 93: 107). 
He undertook this work to distance himself from the drug culture 
or, as he testified, to "burn my bridges" (Id. at 111). He was 
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County jail at the time of trial 
(Id. at 110). 
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was there maybe 30 seconds and she came back with the drugs'7 (Id. 
at 118) .2 Grogan testified that although he did not see the 
actual transaction, he did see defendant "hold the 100-dollar 
bill up into the light as if inspecting it" (Id. at 163; accord 
id. at 169, 174) . A reluctant witness, Ky testified that she 
approached defendant's vehicle and "[e]xchanged. . . . [m]oney 
for dope" by dropping the money in defendant's lap and taking a 
bag containing six individually-packaged rocks of crack cocaine 
from defendant (Id. at 118, 142, 163). Ky returned to Grogan's 
vehicle with the drugs in her hand (Id. at 118, 143, 163). Brian 
testified: 
Yeah, she had them in her hand and she -
there was six packages of crack cocaine. And 
she gave them to Officer Grogan, and then she 
wanted to get some for getting the drugs, 
kind of like the middleman type deal, so . . 
. he gave me the drugs and I gave her [a] 
little piece of one of the rocks or one of 
the six packages I gave her, so there was 
only five left, for getting it. 
(Id. at 118; accord id. at 143, 165).3 
As soon as the transaction was complete, defendant left the 
parking lot in the Pontiac (Id. at 92). Ky's brother, meanwhile, 
had followed Grogan's vehicle to the gas station. Ky left 
2
 Brian testified that he did not watch the actual 
transaction because NN[i]t's not something that you like to deal 
with to see who they're getting it from" (R. 93: 120). 
3
 Brian further explained that payment for the peison who 
arranged a drug transaction was common: "They go out of their way 
and get the drugs for you and they're like, I don't know, I don't 
think she made money, so for doing it I gave her a little bit so 
she'd have something" (Id. at 119). 
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Grogan' s car and drove off with her brother (Id. at 119-20, 165). 
Another officer involved in the operation then radioed ahead to a 
surveillance officer, who located the Pontiac. After observing 
the Pontiac's driver commit a traffic violation, the officer 
stopped the car, identified both occupants, issued a warning, and 
then let the car go (IcL. at 92, 179-80). 
Neither Ky nor defendant were immediately arrested. A 
member of the Narcotics Task Force explained: 
[W]e were doing numerous controlled purchases 
in the Ogden area for the crack cocaine, it's 
not unusual for us just to stop, get a person 
identified and release them and then charge 
them down the road. With that many people 
and the people that Brian was working for us 
with, we were not arresting those individuals 
at that time. We let them walk, what we call 
walk with our money. So we just get them 
identified and we charge them down the road. 
(Id. at 93). Eventually, officers arrested and charged both Ky 
and defendant (Id^ . at 109, 144). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict because a key witness was not credible and 
because neither the undercover officer nor the confidential 
informant observed the actual drug transaction. Because 
defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling requirement, 
her claim need not even be considered. Even on the merits, 
however, it fails. First, the burden of assessing the 
credibility of the witnesses rests with the jury, not with the 
appellate court. Second, on review, this Court considers both 
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the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
that evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, considering the fair inferences and 
leaving all witness credibility determinations to the jury, there 
can be no doubt that defendant knew what she was doing, intended 
her actions, and took active steps to facilitate the completion 
of a drug transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTION WHERE DEFENDANT WAS 
CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE TO SELL 
COCAINE AND SHOWED UP AT THE 
SPECIFIED LOCATION TO MEET THE 
TARGET AND COMPLETE A DRUGS-FOR-
MONEY EXCHANGE 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction for distribution of a controlled substance. 
Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. She contends that the evidence suggested 
that Ky, rather than defendant, was the guilty party.4 Id. at 7, 
13. Moreover, she asserts that because Ky was a known drug 
addict and convicted felon, her testimony implicating defendant 
was inherently unbelievable. Because neither the undercover 
officer nor the confidential informant observed the actual drug 
transaction and because Ky's testimony was "so improbable," 
4
 By suggesting that Ky rather than defendant was the 
guilty party, defendant has framed her argument as an "either/or 
proposition. See Br. of Aplt. at 7. The statutory crime, 
however, encompasses both distribution and acts prepatory to 
distribution. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Where 
defendant supplied the cocaine and Ky acted as middleman, both 
defendant and Ky could be culpable under the statute. 
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defendant concludes that a reasonable jury necessarily would have 
entertained a reasonable doubt and acquitted her. Id. at 7-8, 
12-13. 
At the outset, although defendant refers to the marshaling 
requirement, she fails to "fully embrac[e] the [State's] 
position." State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 117, 124 P.3d 235; Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(articulating marshaling requirement). She 
does not engage in the process of meaningfully gathering the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict and demonstrating how it 
necessarily falls short of supporting the jury's verdict. See 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990)(adopting 
marshaling requirement for sufficiency challenge to jury 
verdict). For this reason alone, defendant's claim may be 
rejected. 
Even if this Court chooses to reach the merits, defendant 
fares no better. A reviewing court will reverse a criminal 
conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence is so 
lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt" that defendant committed the crime. State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds, State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987). However, u[w]here there 
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the 
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, [the court's] 
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inquiry is complete and [it] will sustain the verdict." State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). 
The statute under which defendant was convicted provides 
that "it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally distribute . . . or . . . agree, consent, offer or 
arrange to distribute a controlled . . . substance." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (West 2004). The caselaw interpreting 
this statute is clear. All that is necessary to establish the 
offense is a knowing or intentional mental state along with an 
offer or arrangement to distribute drugs. State v. Harrison, 601 
P.2d 922, 924 n.5 (Utah 1979). 
Intent to commit the crime, usually not susceptible to 
direct proof, can be inferred from defendant's actions or from 
surrounding circumstances.5 State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 
110, 988 P.2d 949. As to the act of offering or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, "any witting or intentional 
lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it 
takes, is proscribed by the act." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923; 
accord State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, M 9-10, 3 P.3d 725; 
State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App 1990); State v. 
5
 Proof of an actual sale can be helpful in establishing 
knowledge or intent but is not a necessary element of the crime. 
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 112, 3 P.3d 725 (citing cases 
in which, "[e]ven absent proof of a completed distribution, . . . 
[other types of evidence] reveal the defendant's intent by 
showing that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the 
completion of an illicit transaction"). 
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Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986). Thus, if defendant 
serves as "one link in a chain of events • . . which eventually 
led to the sale of [an unlawful controlled substance]," he is 
culpable under the statute. Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185. 
Applying the law to the facts, defendant's claim fails for 
two reasons. First, defendant neglects the role of the jury in 
assessing the credibility of witnesses. The law is well-settled 
that "determinations of witness credibility are left to the jury. 
The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any 
witness's testimony." State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Utah App. 
1990)). 
When the evidence presented is conflicting or 
disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular 
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 
not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). This Court is not positioned to second-guess the 
jury's assessment of Ky's credibility. Ky did indeed testify 
that when the parties met at the gas station, their cars were 
positioned differently than Officer Grogan testified. Compare R. 
93: 150 with R. 93: 161. She also testified that she stood by 
defendant's vehicle when buying the drugs while Grogan testified 
that she sat in the back seat. Compare id. at 149 with id. at 
175). Minor inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness's 
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testimony, however, will not warrant reversal based on 
insufficient evidence. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah 
App. 1998). Notably, there was no testimonial inconsistency 
about the gist of the transaction - that Ky gave defendant a $100 
bill, and that defendant gave Ky six rocks of cocaine in exchange 
for the money. The jury chose to believe this evidence, and this 
Court accords deference to that determination. 
Second, defendant's claim fails because she neglects to give 
deference to the fair inferences that arise from the facts. See 
Gardner, 789 P.2d at 285. While defendant contends that the 
evidence was insufficient because neither Officer Grogan nor 
Brian observed the actual transaction, she fails to credit the 
inferences that reasonably arise from the evidence before the 
jury. As to the element of intent, the evidence and its fair 
inferences amply support that defendant knew what she was doing 
and that she acted intentionally. Defendant responded to a call 
from Ky that she "need[ed] a C note," she appeared at the 
location Ky specified, she met briefly with Ky, and she left 
immediately thereafter (R. 93: 135, 149, 162-63). Defendant and 
Ky had known each other for "years" and communicated the quantity 
of drugs sought with the term "C note," which fairly implies 
defendant's familiarity with and involvement in the drug culture 
(Id. at 131, 149). There is neither evidentiary nor inferential 
support for a claim that defendant went to the gas station 
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parking lot for any reason other than to conduct a drug 
transaction with Ky.6 
As to the act of arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance, Ky telephoned defendant in order to get drugs to sell 
to Brian (R. 93: 135, 162). When defendant showed up shortly 
thereafter, Ky walked over to her with a $100 bill, and returned 
less than a minute later with six rocks of cocaine7 (Id. at 118, 
142, 162-63). Ky never put her hands in her pockets or otherwise 
concealed what she was giving to or receiving from defendant (Id. 
at 118, 143, 162, 170). The fair inference arising from this 
testimony is that Ky took the money to defendant and that, in 
exchange for it, defendant gave Ky the six rocks of cocaine. 
Moreover, the undercover officer saw defendant hold the $100 bill 
up to the light, as if to assess whether it might be counterfeit 
(Id. at 163, 169, 173). The fair inference from this act is that 
defendant wanted to ensure that she was receiving fair value in 
exchange for the cocaine she was giving to Ky. Moreover, once 
back in Grogan's vehicle, Ky asked the men for some cocaine, 
which both Grogan and Brian explained was typical payment within 
the drug culture for arranging a drug sale (Id. at 118-19, 164-
6
 Ky unequivocally denied that she had ever owed defendant 
any money, as defense counsel suggests on appeal. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 13; R. 93: 146, 148. 
7
 Defendant frames her argument largely as a response to a 
charge only of distribution. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. In fact, 
defendant was charged with distribution or, in the alternative, 
with agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance. R. 1-2. 
11 
65). Inferentially, then, this testimony corroborates that 
defendant sold Ky cocaine for $100. Otherwise, Ky would not have 
asked for her "cut" for arranging the sale. 
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, considering the fair inferences, 
and leaving all determinations of witness credibility to the 
jury, the evidence sufficed to conclude that defendant knew what 
she was doing, intended her actions, and took active steps to 
facilitate the completion of a drug transaction. No more is 
necessary to sustain her conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of distributing or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first 
degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj_ day of May, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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